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Televised Trials: Constitutional Constraints,
Practical Implications, and State Experimentation
INTRODUCTION

It has been fifty years since a court first addressed the conflict
between a defendant's right of fair trial and the presence of the
photographic media in the courtroom.' This conflict was exacerbated further by the demand that the television camera be used to
offer a live presentation of judicial proceedings.' Reacting to what
it feared would be a disruptive influence on the accused's right to a
fair trial, a federal rule was enacted in 1946 banning the camera
from federal trials.3 A similar proscription was drafted by the American Bar Association and adopted in a majority of states.4 However,
decisions from jurisdictions rejecting the ABA proposal,' or ignoring
1. Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 A. 312 (1927).
2. See Yesawich, Televising and Broadcasting Trials, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 701 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as Yesawich], which discusses the early demands for televised trials arising shortly after the birth of the television industry.
3. Rule 53 provides:
The taking of photographs in the courtroom during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the courtroom shall not be
permitted by the court.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 53.
4. ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETmIcs No. 35 (1937). Canon 35 was amended in 1952 to
specifically include television. Originally, it had banned taking photographs in the courtroom
during a trial and the radio broadcasting of any court proceedings. In 1972 the ABA House
of Delegates adopted the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct. This Code is merely a revision and
renumbering of the original Canons of Judicial Ethics. Canon 35 is now embodied in Canon
3A(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. It provides, in pertinent part: "A judge should prohibit
broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions.
... ABA
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

No. 3A(7)(1972). For a look at some of the arguments pro and con

concerning Canon 35 (now No. 3A(7) ) see Blashfield, The Case of the Controversial Canon,
48 A.B.A.J. 429 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Blashfield]; Wilkin, Judicial Canon 35 Should
Not Be Changed, 48 A.B.A.J. 540 (1962); Griswold, The Standards of the Legal Profession:
Canon 35 Should Not be Surrendered, 48 A.B.A.J. 615 (1962); Warden, Canon 35: Is There
Room for Objectivity?, 4 WASHBURN L.J. 211 (1965). See also Doubles, A Camera in the
Courtroom, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Doubles]; Note, Canon
35: Cameras, Courts and Confusion, 51 Ky. L.J. 737 (1963). Despite the broad acceptance of
Canon 3A(7) by the states, the ABA House of Delegates will meet in August, 1978 to consider
changing the Canon to allow trials to be televised. ABA Press Release, April 13, 1978. William
Spann Jr., the present President of the ABA, stated in a speech to the West Virginia Bar
Association that television should be allowed to cover appellate court proceedings because
"they often involve important Constitutional issues about which the American public needs
to receive information." Id. Spann stated, however, that "definitive action" concerning televised trials should be delayed until an evaluation of ongoing state experiments could be made.
5. Colorado dealt with ABA Canon 35 in In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35, 133 Colo.
417, 296 P.2d 465 (1956). In that opinion, the Colorado Supreme Court rejected the ABA's
version of Canon 35 and adopted their own 'ersion of the rule. Id. at 472. In 1966 the rule
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it,' have rekindled the debate over courtroom television.
in Estes v. Texas,7 the Supreme Court held that the telecasting
of "notorious criminal trials" was a denial of the defendant's right
to due process of law.8 Aside from the obvious physical distractions
that the presence of the television camera would cause,9 the Court
was concerned that the psychological impact of being televised
would impair the witnesses' ability to give testimony and the jurors'
capacity to reach an unpressured verdict.'0 However, the Court indicated that as technology advanced it might be possible to televise
trials without disrupting the trial proceedings."
was modified to require the consent of the defendant before any telecasting. See Note, 38 U.
COLO. L. REV. 276, 278 (1966). The present Colorado rule reads as follows:
(9) A judge should prohibit the broadcasting by radio or television of court proceedings, or the taking of photographs in the courtroom, where he believes from the
particular circumstances of a given case or any portion thereof, that the broadcasting or taking of photographs would:
(a) detract from the dignity of court proceedings;
(b) distract the witness in giving his testimony;
(c) degrade the court; or
(d) otherwise materially interfere with the achievement of a fair trial.
(10) A judge shall prohibit:
(a) the photographing, or broadcasting by radio or television of testimony, of any
witness or juror in attendance under subpoena or order of court who has expressly
objected to the photographing or broadcasting by radio or television, of any selection of the jury and continuing until the issues have been submitted to the jury for
determination, unless all accused persons who are then on trial shall have affirmatively given their consent to the photographing or broadcasting.
COLORADO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT No. 3A(9)(iv) (1966).
6. See, e.g., Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958). Subsequent to the Lyles
decision the Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted a rule which prohibited the televising of trial
proceedings. OKLA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS No. 35, in OKLA. STAT. ANN., Appendix 4, tit.
5, at 186 (Supp. 1966). See also Hall, Colorado's Six Years' Experience Without Judicial
Canon 35, 48 A.B.A.J. 1120 (1962).
7. 381 U.S. 532 (1965). For discussion of this case see Case Note, Televising Criminal
Trials of Widespread Public Interest Inherently Deprives Defendant of Due Process of Law,
34 FORDHAM L. REV. 329 (1965); Case Note, 30 ALa. L. REv. 158 (1966); Case Note, 27 U. PITT.
L. REV. 141 (1965); Case Note, 18 VAND. L. REv. 2049 (1965). See also Note, Constitutional
Aspects of Television In The Courtroom, 35 U. CIN. L. REV. 48 (1966); Comment, The Televised Trial: A Perspective, 7 CUM.-SAM. L. REv. 323 (1976).
8. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). The decision was 5 to 4. Four of the five majority
justices ruled that televising criminal trials was inherently violative of due process without
regard to the circumstances. Mr. Justice Harlan, who cast the fifth majority vote, concurred
in the decision with the express reservation that it apply only to the televising of "courtroom
proceedings of widespread public interest." Id. at 587. Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion, as
restricted, represents the practical holding of the case. Although most of the discussion in
this article focuses upon criminal defendants, much of the analysis affects civil trials as well.
9. Id. at 546, 549, 591, 592, 595.
10. Id. at 545, 547, 595.
11. Id. at 551-52. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, noted that televised trials
might be acceptable when television became so commonplace in the daily life of the average
person that its use would not "impair the judicial process." Id. at 595-96. Thus, while the
Court's opinion is directed at physical distractions which would need to be eliminated, Justice
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Today, proponents of televised trials assert that the technological
advances alluded to in Estes are now a reality." In the past three
years several states, convinced by these arguments, have begun to
televise trials under court supervision." This article will examine
Harlan's opinion is aimed at the elimination of psychological distractions. Due to this dichotomy, it is unclear if the Estes decision is to be interpreted to mean that both the development
of inconspicuous cameras and microphones, as well as human adjustment to the presence of
cameras, would have to be established before trials could be televised. It has been argued that
the decision did not mean that the development of inconspicuous cameras would be sufficient
to allow trials to be televised: only if it was also established that the presence of the cameras
would have no significant psychological impact on the witnesses, jurors and other trial participants would televised trials be allowed. Note, Televising Criminal Trials of Widespread
Public Interest Inherently Deprives Defendant of Due Process of Law, 34 FORDHAM L. REV.
329, 334 n.39 (1965). Others have argued that even if the Court intended both conditions be
met before trials could be televised, the use of unobtrusive cameras, miniature microphones
and natural lighting would eliminate any psychological disturbance to the trial participants.
Monroe, BroadcastersIn The Courtroom: Two Views-The Case For Courtroom Television,
21 FED. COM. BAR. J. 48, 51 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Monroe]; Wilson, Justice In Living
Color: The Case For Courtroom Television, 60 A.B.A.J. 294, 295 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Wilson].
12. Monroe, supra note 11, at 50, 51; Blashfield, supra note 4, at 432, 433.
13. Presently, seven states are televising trials: Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Montana, Washington and Wisconsin.
Alabama-On December 15, 1975, the Alabama Supreme Court adopted a canon of judicial
ethics. Canon 3A(7A) of that code allows the trial judge to authorize the broadcasting or
televising of trial proceedings. ALABAMA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHics No. 3A(7A), appendix in
37 ALA. LAW. 10, 16 (1976). For a discussion of this canon, see Comment, The Televised Trial:
A Perspective, 7 CUM.-SAM. L. REv. 323 (1976).
Florida-On January 28, 1976, the Florida Supreme Court initiated an experimental program in which one civil and one criminal trial would be televised. Petition of Post-Newsweek
Stations, Florida Inc. For Change in the Code of Judicial Conduct, 327 So. 2d 1 (1976). The
guidelines for the experiment required that all trial participants consent before the trial could
be televised. Id. at 2. After being unable to find a trial in which all the trial participants would
consent to being televised, the Supreme Court of Florida eliminated this prerequisite. Petition of Post-Newsweek Station, Florida, Inc. for Change in the Code of Judicial Conduct, 347
So. 2d 402, 403 (1977). The court made an additional change in the experimental program.
Instead of having only two televised trials, courtroom television would be authorized for a
full year. Id. at 403. The court later set up various guidelines for the television media pertaining to the type of equipment used, the type of lighting permissible, the number of personnel
allowed in the courtroom, and the type of material which could not be broadcast. The material that could not be broadcast was limited to the audio portion of attorney-client conferences
and conferences between the attorneys and the judge. Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations,
Florida, Inc. for Change in the Code of Judicial Conduct, 347 So. 2d 404 (1977).
Georgia-On May 12, 1977 the Supreme Court of Georgia adopted Canon 3A(8) which
expressly authorized televising of trials in two of the states' judicial circuits.
Montana-Pursuant to order of the Montana Supreme Court, Montana began a two year
experiment, which commenced on February 3, 1978.
Washington-On July 23, 1976, the Washington Supreme Court amended Canon 3A(7) of
the Washington Code of Judicial Conduct to allow trials to be televised.
Wisconsin-On April 1, 1978, Wisconsin began a one year experiment under supervision of
the state supreme court. However, the first courtroom proceeding which was televised under
this program was the extradition hearing of Simon Peter Nelson, an Illinois man accused of
murdering his six children. The Chicago Tribune, January 10, 1978, Sec. 1, at col. 2.
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the constitutional considerations involved when exploring the
unique threat posed by the presence of television cameras in the
courtroom. In addition, an examination of protective guidelines established by those states which televise trials will be undertaken.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

The controversy over televising trials involves four conflicting
rights, each of which is grounded in a different constitutional guarantee: (1) the right of privacy of the defendant, witnesses, and jurors;" (2) the right of public trial; 5 (3) the right of freedom of the
press;" and (4) defendant's right to a fair trial. 7 Though previously
examined and balanced in the traditional trial context," each of
these rights must be reevaluated when the trial is to be televised.
Right of Privacy
The right of privacy, while once of questionable validity," has
gained substantial constitutional recognition in recent years.20
In addition to these states, Minnesota, Nevada and New Hampshire all allow their state
supreme court proceedings to be televised. Recently, the Illinois News Broadcasters Association petitioned the Illinois Supreme Court to lift the television ban in that state. Chicago
Tribune, April 23, 1978, sec. 1, p. 3 at col. 1.
14. The right of privacy has no textual basis in the Constitution, but it has been found
to be implicitly guaranteed by the first, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments. See Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); cf. Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Planned Parenthood Association v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
See also Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 1, 329 & n.25, 240 (1975).
[hereinafter cited as Gerety]
15. The right to a public trial is guaranteed by the sixth amendment of the United States
Constitution. It reads, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial ..
" U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. Freedom of the press is guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States
Constitution. It reads, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom . . . of the press ..
" U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. The right to a fair trial is guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
18. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1975); Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (discussing free press and fair trial); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 538-41 (1965); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (discussing the sixth amendment right
to a public trial); Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Berg v. Minneapolis
Star & Tribune, 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948) (discussing a defendant's right of privacy
while standing trial).
19. See Yesawich, supra note 2, at 711 & n.36.
20. See note 14 supra.
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Numerous definitions of the right of privacy have been offered,21 but
essentially it stands for the right to maintain one's "inviolate personality." ' This c ncept has been interpreted to represent an individual's ability to maintain "independance, dignity and integrity."2 3 Thus, practices which threaten to strip a person of his
human dignity or integrity would be constitutionally impermissible.
Arguably, a person on trial has his privacy violated when widespread reporting of his plight turns his private life into a public
spectacle. The traditional position, however, is that a defendant
loses his privacy rights when he stands trial.24 This view has been
justified on two distinct grounds: (1) when a person becomes a public figure he impliedly waives his right of privacy; 5 and (2) a person's privacy is not invaded when public information concerning
him is published or braodcast.2 6
This latter proposition was recently relied upon by the Supreme
Court in two cases involving dissemination of public information. In
Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn, 7 the Court held that the
state could not sanction the press for accurately reporting the name
of a rape victim. 2 One year later, in Paul v. Davis,5 the Court found
that the publication and subsequent public distribution of plaintiff's picture as a shoplifter did not violate his right of privacy. The
Court saw no constitutional distinction from the fact that the records at issue pertained to arrests rather than convictions, and persisted in the view that publication of material in public records did
not violate any constitutional rights.'" Thus, Cox and Paul, along
21. See generally Gerety, supra note 14; Blaustein, An Answer to Dean Prosser: Privacy
As An Aspect of Human Dignity, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962 (1964)[hereinafter cited as Blaustein]; Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 204 (1890).
22. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 21, at 204. But see Gerety,
supra note 14, at 237 n.18. Gerety argues that this definition is vague and does not sufficiently
limit the legal protection which the right of privacy gives to the individual.
23. Blaustein, supra note 21, at 971.
24. Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Berg v. Minneapolis Star &
Tribune, 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948); Abernathy v. Thornton, 263 Ala. 496, 83 So. 2d
235 (1955); Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 (1939). It should
be noted that each of the cases cited for this proposition involved civil suits, as opposed to
criminal actions. It could, therefore, be inferred that this general rule would not apply in
criminal cases. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 21, at 216-17. See
also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 493 (1975)
25. Blashfield, supra note 4, at 433. See also Gerety, supra note 14, at 293-94 & n.208; cf.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 355 U.S. 374 (1967); New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
26. See Note, ConstitutionalAspects of Television In The Courtroom, 35 U. CIN. L. REV.
48, 54 (1966) and cases cited in note 25 supra.
27. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
28. Id. at. 494-95.
29. 42 4 U.S. 693 (1976).
30. Id. at 712-13. For an extended discussion of the problem of privacy and the distribu-
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with traditional notions about privacy rights of those on trial, ap"a weak reed to rely upon to
pear to make the right of privacy
31
trial."
a
of
telecast
a
prevent
However, the potential for intimate closeups and widespread exposure of not only the name of the defendant, but of his face and
features,32 emotions,3 3 and possibly even his private thoughts,M
makes the telecasting of a trial unique. There is an obvious difference from mere reporting of cold facts from a public record, regardless of how intimate those facts might be. It also differs from standard news coverage. Thus, the privacy rights of those who stand
trial must be re-evaluated in light of the intricacies of this medium.
Extensive publicity concerning a person's identity and the inti5
mate details of his life is a primary concern in privacy analysis.
Such widespread publicity has the potential to degrade the individual, destroy his human dignity and consequentially violate his privacy.3" This threat of extensive disclosure of the defendant's life is
inherent in the concept of a televised trial. Televised trials would
reach a far greater audience than ordinary news coverage 7 and
would capture the attention of those who were previously uninterested.3 8 Furthermore, since television extensively promotes the programs it airs, promotional messages for upcoming trials would also
tion of criminal records, see Comment, The Press and Criminal Record Privacy, 20 ST. Louis
U.L. REv. 509 (1976).
31. Yesawich, supra note 2, at 712.
32. In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 577, 578 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring), the Court
describes the close-up shots of the defendant's face which were taken by the television cameras stationed in various parts of the courtroom.
33. In the recent televising of an extradition hearing in Wisconsin, the cameras focused
in on the defendant as he tearfully attempted to answer questions from the bench concerning
the mass murder of his six children. See note 13 supra.
34. While a camera cannot read a defendant's mind, it can be used to accomplish basically the same thing, e.g., when the camera zooms in over the defendant's shoulder to read a
newspaper article which he is reading. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 578 (1965) (Warren,
C.J., concurring).
35. See Gerety, supra note 14, at 291.
36. Blaustein, supra note 21, at 981.
37. See Douglas, The Public Trial And the Free Press, 33 RoCKY MT. L. REv. 1, 5
(1960)[hereinafter cited as Douglas].
38. In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), the Supreme Court recognized the new interest
which is created in a previously unnoticed trial when it is televised. The Court stated:
From the moment the trial judge announces that a case will be televised it becomes
a cause ckl'bre. The whole community, including prospective jurors, becomes interested in all the morbid details surrounding it. The approaching trial immediately
assumes an important status in the public press and the accused is highly publicized along with the offense with which he is charged.
Id. at 545; cf. Bell v. Patterson, 479 F. Supp. 760, 769 (D. Colo. 1968), aff'd on other grounds,
402 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 955 (1971).
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enlarge the viewing audience.3
It has been argued, nonetheless, that the extent of publication is
unimportant in dtermining whether the defendant's right of privacy has been violated. 0 It is contended that as long as the information made public was never private, no invasion of privacy occurs.4'
This ignores the fact that much of what goes on in a trial is basically
private, receiving little attention in standard news coverage. For
example, numerous details about a defendant are normally presented as evidence at a trial. While most of such details about the
defendant's life would go unreported or unnoticed in standard news
coverage, television would broadcast this information to millions of
people.
This problem was confronted in United States v. Mitchell,42 where
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently recognized that
mass disclosure of evidentiary facts introduced at trial could constitute an invasion of a defendant's privacy. The Mitchell court was
presented with an appeal from a district court order prohibiting the
National Broadcasting Company and Warner Brothers from distributing the famous "Watergate" tapes to the public. The appellee,
former President Nixon, claimed that mass disclosure of these
tapes, which had been played into evidence at the Mitchell trial,
would be an "intrusion on the sensibilities of those whose voices
appear on the tapes."' 3 Nixon sought to have the district court's
order upheld, asserting mass disclosure of the tapes would constitute an invasion of his privacy." The court rejected Nixon's privacy
claim, holding that the public's right to inspect the tapes su39. Such promotional messages were, in fact, used during the telecasting of the Billie Sol
Estes trial to heighten viewer interest. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 571 (1965) (Warren C.J.
concurring):
"Tomorrow morning at 9:55 the WFAA T.V. cameras will be in Tyler to telecast
live [the trial judge's] decision whether or not he will permit live coverage of the
Billie Sol Estes trial. If so, this will be the first such famous national criminal
proceeding to be televised in its entirety live. [The trial judge] was appointed to
the bench here in Tyler in 1942 by [the Governor]. The judge has served every two
years since then. The very beautiful Smith County Courthouse was built and dedicated in 1954, but before that [the trial judge] had made a reputation for himself
that reached not only throughout Texas, but throughout the United States as well.
It is said that [the trial judge], who is now 53 years old, has tried more cases than
any other judge during his time in office."
Id. at 571-72.
40. See Note, ConstitutionalAspects Of Television In The Courtroom, 35 U. CIN. L. REV.
48, 54 (1966). But see note 47 infra.
41. Id.
42. 551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1578 (1977).
43. Id. at 1263.
44. Id.
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perseded his privacy interests.45 However, the court noted that it
was the unique nature of these particular tapes which militated
against Nixon's claim. These facts did not present the court with
"a hypothetical case in which evidence previously accessible to only
a few spectators.
suddenly become[s] available to the entire
public."" Thus, the Mitchell court inferred that different standards
might be applicable in other, perhaps more traditional, cases.
Aside from the broad scope of disclosure inherent in the televised
broadcasting of trials, the potentially offensive nature of the exposure also represents an invasion of privacy. Inevitably, there will be
numerous close-up shots of expressions, hand gestures and emotions
which will trespass upon the "inviolate personality" which the right
of privacy is supposed to protect. 7 The Estes Court characterized
the use of such camera shots as a form of "mental harrassment"
which forced the defendant to stand trial while undergoing
"widespread public surveillance."48 Moreover, the defendant is not
the only trial participant whose privacy is endangered by the presence of television in the courtroom. 9 Witnesses and jurors, who in
standard proceedings remain relatively unknown, become public
figures when a trial is televised. Television exposure will inevitably
subject them to a barrage of encounters with "inquisitive strangers
and cranks," who may want the testimony explained, or the verdict
justified. 0 Since witnesses and jurors are, in a real sense, simply
performing a required public duty, to subject them to this type of
badgering imposes a particularly invidious form of privacy invasion.
Id. at 1263-64.
Id. at 1264. The court stated:
First, the conversations at issue relate to the conduct of the presidency and thus
they are both impressed with the "public trust." Second, the fact that the transcripts of the conversations already have received wide circulation make this unlike
a hypothetical case in which evidence previously accessible only to a few spectators
will suddenly become available to the entire public.

45.
46.

Id.
47. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, supra note 21. One essential aspect of
the "inviolate personality" which Warren and Brandeis described in their seminal article on
privacy was the ability to determine "to what extent [a person's] thoughts, sentiments and
emotions [should] be communicated to others." Id. at 198. Certainly an individual who must
tolerate having millions of television viewers examine his every movement has lost this most
essential right. See also Wilkin, JudicialCanon 35 Should Not Be Changed, 48 A.B.A.J. 540,
541 (1962). But see In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
48. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 549 (1965).
49. The Supreme Court recognized a juror's right of privacy in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 353, 355 (1966). The Court later recognized a witnesses' right of privacy in Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 547 (1965).
50. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 547 (1965). Even prospective jurors could face threats
to their privacy if their identity is widely publicized. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,
353 (1966).
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Furthermore, in many trials, a witness is asked questions of a personal nature during examination by counsel. 5 With the advent of
television, this pei 3onal information, that may only play an insignificant part in the total litigation, will be broadcast to millions of
52
television viewers.
The television camera's unique ubiquitousness dictates a reconsideration of conventional notions of privacy when evaluating that
medium's impact on a judicial proceeding. However, since the right
of privacy is not absolute, even adherence to the view that courtroom cameras infringe on this interest will not necessarily remove
the cameras from the courtroom. Privacy interests at times must
yield to other compelling constitutional considerations. The right
of a public trial and the right to a free press are most often cited as
being victimized by a ban on in-court television cameras.54 If these
objections are valid, it is arguable that the trial participants' rights
of privacy may be subordinated, and the telecasts allowed."5 There51. Impugning a witness' character is a method often used by attorneys to attack a witness' credibility. McCoRMICK, EVMENCE §§ 81-82 (2d ed. 1972). Such attacks can be broad
based, including a witness' prior convictions, his prior bad conduct and his reputation in the
community. Id. at §§ 82-92. The practice of assailing a witness' character to damage his
credibility, while necessary to our system of legal advocacy, would result in severe infringement upon the privacy rights of witnesses participating in televised trials as they would now
be forced to discuss skeletons in the closet in front of millions of television viewers.
52. An example of a witness suffering this sort of invasion of privacy came during the
famous Watergate hearings. This political imbroglio included Congressional hearings on an
alleged break-in of Democratic National Headquarters that purportedly reached the inner
circle of the Republican presidency. John Dean, a key figure in the Watergate affair, was
being questioned by the Senate Watergate Committee about his role in that scandal. In an
attack upon Dean's credibility, Senator Herman Talmadge questioned Dean about unethical
business dealings in which Dean had allegedly been involved several years before joining the
White House staff. J. DEAN, BUND AMaITON 313 (1976). In answering these charges, Dean was
forced to reveal to millions of television viewers a personal and private incident that was
completely unrelated to the subject of the hearings. Of course, in the case of the Watergate
hearings public interest justified televising the proceedings, despite the serious invasion of
privacy which this caused to witnesses such as Dean. However, forcing witnesses in murder
trials, for example, to bare the details of their personal life to a television audience cannot
be similarly justified. This problem would assume even greater proportion in criminal trials
involving rape and other sex crimes.
53. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 389 (1977).
54. See Comment, The New Star Chamber-TV In The Courtroom, 32 So. CAL. L. REv.
281 (1959); contra, Doubles, supra note 4; Douglas, surpa note 43.
55. That is not to say that if it is shown that the ban on televised trials represents a slight
infringement on either the right to a public trial or the right of free press that the trial
participants' right to privacy must be automatically set aside. Clearly, the Constitution sets
up no such inflexible system of priority among the various Bill of Rights. Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951)(Frankfurther, J., concurring). The decision whether to allow
television into the courtroom must ultimately be determined by an application of Frankfurter's "constitutional balancing" standard, i.e., an "informed weighing of the competing
interests." Id. at 525. Of course, an informed determination as to whether to allow television
in the courtroom cannot be made without also considering the threat to fair trial, posed by
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fore, it is necessary to examine the extent that a television ban
infringes upon these two guarantees.
Right of Public Trial
The sixth amendment guarantees the right to a public trial.5" The
purpose of this guarantee is to protect against secret proceedings
and to assure the defendant a fair and open trial. 7 The right to a
public trial is considered to be a personal one, vested solely in the
accused and created exclusively for his protection. It follows, therefore, that a rule prohibiting television in the courtroom does not
infringe on the sixth amendment since it in no way denies a defendant a public proceeding. Some have argued, however, that there
is a "second major purpose" embodied in that guarantee-the public's right to be kept informed of what occurs in the courts.59 Several
courts have recognized this societal right and have held that, absent
proper justification, the public may not be excluded from trial proceedings 0 Since the Supreme Court has yet to hand down a definisuch a practice. Consideration of the fair trial aspect of this constitutional conflict is presented in a subsequent section of this article. See text accompanying notes 97 through 140
infra.
56. See note 15 supra.
57. In re Oliver,_333 U.S. 257 (1948).
58. United Press Assoc. v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
59. Comment, The New Star Chamber-TV In The Courtroom, 32 So. CAL. L. REV. 281,
288 (1959); see also Note, ConstitutionalAspects of Television in the Courtroom, 35 U. CIN.
L. REV. 48, 50 (1965).
60. E.W. Scripps v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896 (1955); State v. Hensley,
75 Ohio St. 255, 79 N.E. 462 (1906); see United States v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 274 F. Supp. 790 (W.D. Pa. 1967); cf. Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1958) and In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35, 133 Colo. 417, 296 P.2d 465 (1956)
(both discussing the importance of educating the public as to what occurs in the courtroom).
The educational value of televising trials has also been asserted as a major reason for allowing
television into the courtroom. Wilson, supra note 12, at 296; Warden, Canon 35: Is There
Room For Objectivity, 4 WASHBURN L.J. 211, 217-19 (1965); contra, Douglas, supra note 43,
at 4-5; Doubles, supra note 4, at 9. On the other hand, those who oppose televised trials assert
that television will come to the courtroom to entertain, not to educate, and that the public
will receive an erroneous impression of courtroom proceedings. See, e.g., Chief Justice Warren's concurrence in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 552 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring):
The televising of trials would cause the public to equate the trial process with the
forms of entertainment regularly seen on television and with the commercial objectives of the television industry. . .. [I]f trials were televised there would be a
natural tendency on the part of broadcasters to develop the personalities of the trial
participants, so as to give the proceedings more of an element of drama.
The television industry might also decide that the bareboned trial itself does not
contain sufficient drama to sustain an audience. It might provide expert commentary on the proceedings and hire persons with legal backgrounds to anticipate
possible trial strategy, as the football expert anticipates plays for his audience.
Id. at 571 72.
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tive interpretation of the scope of the right to a public trial,' the
"public right" interpretation of the sixth amendment, although a
minority position,"2 cannot be perfunctorily dismissed. Yet, even
those courts which acknowledge this purpose agree that the right is
not absolute. 3 The public may be excluded in cases involving moral
turpitude, 4 or where their presence would interfere with the ability
to conduct a fair trial.6 5 In addition, it is generally accepted that a
court need not move a trial to a larger enclosure to accomodate the
public when there is insufficient space.6
The press has similar rights as those of the general public and
may not be excluded from the courtroom without justification. It
is argued that since the television industry, as members of the
press," also enjoys the right to freely attend trials, an unjustified
ban on their presence in the courtroom violates their sixth amendment right to a public trial. This argument, of course, points up a
distinction between banishment of the press per se and banishment
of the accoutrements of their profession. The Estes Court addressed
61. The Court discussed the right of public trial in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) but
failed to precisely define the various interests protected by that right. But see Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. 532, 588 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). However, the Supreme Court has found a
societal right in the "speedy trial" aspect of the sixth amendment. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514 (1972).
62. Doubles, supra note 4, at 6.
63. Lattimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Eisner, 533 F.2d
987 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976); Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975).
64. Lattimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1977); Harris v. Stephens, 361 F2d 888 (8th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 (1967); Geise v. United States, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959). Cf. United States v. Akers, 542 F.2d 770 (9th Cir.
1976); Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975);
Stamicarbon, N.V. v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1974); United States
v. Kolbi, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949); Maisonet v. La Vallee, 405 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
65. See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 377 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331,
336 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 266 (1941); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
(1923). It should also be noted that in some jurisdictions the public is excluded from juvenile
proceedings, see, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-20(b) (1975). The Illinois statute authorizes
exclusion of the media as well as the general public. Id.
66. Doubles, supra note 4, at 9. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 589 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
67. E.W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 168, 125 N.E.2d 896, 904 (1955). The
Supreme Court in Estes also gave recognition to this proposition. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 540 (1965).
68. The Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that the television industry has equal
rights as those of the press and general public under the first amendment. See Superior Films,
Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954); Joseph Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495 (1952).
69. Comment, The New Star Chamber-TVIn The Courtroom, 32 So. CAL. L. REV. 281
(1959).
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the latter issue when it stated that since "[t]he news reporter was
not allowed to bring his typewriter or printing press" into the court,
forcing the television reporter to leave his camera at the door did
not infringe on his constitutional right to attend and report on the
trial proceedings."
Freedom of the Press
A second constitutional impediment to banning the camera from
the courtroom is the first amendment's freedom of the press guarantee. Arguably, the ban on televised trials can be classified as an
invalid prior restraint on the broadcast of information. Prior restraint, in the context of a trial, is a judicial order that prohibits
publication of material which might at some later time prejudice a
defendant's right to a fair and impartial proceeding. 7 ' Characterizing these orders as "the most serious and least tolerable
infringement[s] on First Amendment rights,"7 the Supreme Court
has established a strong presumption against their constitutional
validity.73 But such restrictive orders will be allowed when news
coverage of a trial results in an "imminent threat to the administration of justice," which is neither remote nor improbable, but which
immediately imperils the administering of a fair trial.74
This "imminent threat" test was most recently refined by the
Supreme Court in Nebraska PressAssociation v. Stuart,75 where the
Court invalidated a restrictive order that prohibited the publication
or broadcasting of confessions and admissions made by the defendant to police. The Court found that although pre-trial news accounts of the defendant's statements might adversely affect the
attitudes of some prospective jurors, selection of an impartial jury
would still be possible, and thus the "heavy burden" needed to
justify such drastic prior restraint on publication was not met.7
Nebraska indicates that greater deference must be given to the right
of freedom of the press, even when the exercise of that right might
endanger a fair trial. Proponents of in-court cameras can therefore
70. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
71. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556, 557 (1976). See also Fair
Trial/Free Press-Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart: Defining the Limits of Prior Restraint in The Trial by Newspaper Controversy, 8 LoY. CHI. L.J. 417, 433 (1977).
72. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
73. Id. at 558. See also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
74. United States v. Dickensen, 465 F.2d 496, 507 (5th Cir. 1972), quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1946). See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
75. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
76. Id. at 568-70.
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rely on Nebraska to argue that television's threat is too speculative
to justify an absolute ban of televised trials.
Nebraska, however, involved a prior restraint on news reporting
taking place outside of the courtroom. The prohibition of televised
trials differs since it restrains only media activities within the courtroom. A less stringent test is applied in determining the constitutionality of this type of prior restraint." The evolving test in this
situation is not whether the activities of the press represent an
"imminent danger" to the administering of a fair trial, but whether
there is a "potential possibility" that it will do so."8 The Supreme
Court's reasoning in Estes exemplifies the application of this more
moderate test. The Court refrained from applying a prior restraint
analysis to the prohibition of in-court telecasting. Instead, it held
that the probability of such a procedure prejudicing the accused
made a ban on such activity constitutionally permissible."9
Two recent federal cases indicate a trend towards adopting a
stricter test with respect to restraints upon in-court press activities.
0 the Seventh Circuit reviewed a district
In Dorfman v. Meiszner8
court order which prohibited all photography and broadcasting
within the building that housed both the federal courts and various
federal offices.' The court found that the district court could properly "exclude photography and broadcasting which would lead to
disruption or distraction of judicial proceedings." 2 However, this
order was overly broad in that it banned media activities which
presented no significant threat to the administration of justice."
Therefore, the scope of the order went beyond what is permissible
77. Doubles, supra note 4, at 12.
78. State v. Clifford, 162 Ohio St. 370, 123 N.E.2d 8 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 929
(1955). Cf. Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967); Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958). A "probability of prejudice" test was first
adopted by the Supreme Court in Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); accord, Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
79. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1965). A similar approach was used by Justice
Harlan in his concurring opinion:
Once beyond the confines of the courthouse, a newsgathering agency may publicize,
within wide limits, what its representatives have heard and seen in the courtroom.
But the line is drawn at the courthouse door; and within, a reporter's constitutional
rights are no greater than those of any other member of the public. Within the
courthouse the only relevant constitutional consideration is that the accused be
afforded a fair trial.
Id. at 589.
80. 430 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1970).
81. Id. at 561. The prohibition of photography and televising did not apply to all 27 floors
of the building. Certain floors fell outside the scope of the order. But the order did encompass
floors where no judicial proceedings were being held.
82. Id.
83. Id. But cf. Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967).
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under the first amendment. 4 Although Dorfman did not involve
press activities within the courtroom, it is one of the first decisions
giving serious consideration to the press' first amendment right concerning an area so near the courtroom itself.
United States v. Columbia BoradcastingSystem,8 5 went even further than Dorfman. The case involved the validity of a federal district court order during the trial of the "Gainsville Eight.""6 The
order prohibited all in-court sketching as well as the publication of
any drawings of courtroom scenes." An artist for the television network drew four sketches from memory which were subsequently
televised. The Columbia Broadcasting System was convicted of
criminal contempt for disobeying the court order.m
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit applied traditional prior restraint
analysis,89 and concluded that the prohibition of publication of all
sketches of courtroom scenes was constitutionally invalid." Of
greater importance to the television issue was the court's tacit application of an "imminent danger" test to the in-court ban of sketching. Absent a showing that the sketching-was actually obtrusive or
disruptive, its prohibition constituted an unconstitutional restraint
on first amendment rights.9 The Fifth Circuit thus became the first
court to hold that restraints on media activities within a courtroom
must be justified by demonstrating actual prejudice, as opposed to
a potential threat to the administration of justice.
It is widely recognized that television poses at least a potential
danger to a fair trial.9 2 But under traditional prior restraint analysis,
a potential danger is not sufficient to justify the blanket prohibition
84. Id.
85. 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974). See Comment, United States v. C.B.S.: When Sketch
Artists Are Allowed In The Courtroom, Can PhotographersBe Far Behind?, 1975 DUKE L.J.
188.
86. The Gainsville Eight were on trial for allegedly disrupting the 1972 Republican National Convention.
87. 497 F.2d 102, 103 (5th Cir. 1974).
88. The appeal from the criminal conviction of contempt was dealt with in a separate
opinion. United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Company, 497 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1974).
89. See text accompanying notes 71-76 supra.
90. 497 F.2d 102, 106 (5th Cir. 1974).
91. Id. at 106. The court distinguished Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), on the grounds
that sketching individuals, as opposed to televising them, could be done in the courtroom
without distracting the trial participants. Id. at 105-06. This raises the possiblity that the
Fifth Circuit might allow television in the courtroom if it could be demonstrated that televising could be done in an unobtrusive manner. See The Televised Trial: A Perspective, 7 CUM. SAM. L. Rev. 323, 336, 337 n.124 (1976); Comment, United States v. C.B.S.: When Sketch
Artists Are Allowed In The Courtroom, Can PhotographersBe Far Behind?, 1975 DUKE L.J.
188, 201 n.90.
92. See generally articles cited in note 4 supra.
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of televised trials. 3 To justify this type of restraint, an "imminent
danger" to a fair trial must be demonstrated.9 4 Although it is still
an open question whether traditional prior restraint analysis will
ever be applied to the ban on televised trials,9" the trend shown by
Dorfman and United States v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem indicates that such an application is not entirely inconceivable. A movement by the courts in that direction would render unconstitutional
almost any prohibition on televised trials. However, under the present constitutional analysis for evaluating in-court restraints, so
long as the camera is deemed to impose a potential danger, its
banishment should not be considered unconstitutional.
Thus, the paramount consideration is the impact actually imposed by television on an accused's trial rights. Until that question
can be answered with certainty, the other constitutional issues will
remain unresolved.
The Right to a Fair Trial
Courtroom television poses at least three distinct threats to a
defendant's right to a fair trial. First, the physical presence of television in the courtroom disrupts the proceedings and prevents the
trial from acting as the "quiet search for truth" it was designed to
be.9 Second, the presence of television has an adverse psychological
impact on some trial participants.8 Finally, televising a trial results
in widespread, prejudicial publicity about the defendant's case and
hampers his ability to obtain an impartial proceeding.9 Whether
these threats are sufficient to justify the televised ban is a crucial
consideration that requires examination.
1. Physical Distractions
The idea of televised trials was first suggested when the television
industry was in its infancy.100 Early commentators envisioned a
93. See text accompanying notes 71-76 supra.
94. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
95. See Comment, The Televised Trial: A Perspective, 7 Cutm.-Sm. L. REV. 323, 337 &
n. 127 (1976).
96. See text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
97. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 550, 551 (1965); Yesawich, supra note 2, at 708. Contra,
Wilson, supra note 12, at 294-95; Blashfield, supra, note 4, at 429; Doubles, supra note 4, at
4; Monroe, supra note 11, at 51.
98. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). See Douglas, supranote 37, at 5-8; Doubles, supra
note 4, at 13-14; Yesawich, supra note 2; In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35, 133 Colo. 417,
296 P.2d 465 (1956); Wilson, supra note 11, at 294, 295; Monroe, supra note 11, at 52.
99. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Douglas, supra note 43; Yesawich, supra note 2,
at 710-11. But see Quist, The Freedom of Pressure and the Explosive Canon 35, 33 RoCKY
MT. L. REV. 11 (1960); Wilson, supra note 11, at 296.
100. See generally Yesawich, supra note 2.
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courtroom cluttered with cables, microphones, and noisy television
cameras.'0 ' The impact of physical distractions had previously been
demonstrated in the trial of Bruno Hauptmann, the accused murderer of the Lindbergh baby.' 2 The Hauptmann trial was turned
into a spectacle by a proliferation of photographers and reporters,
accompanied by a mass of radio and newsreel equipment.'0 3 The
adverse effect of such distractions was later recognized in the Estes
case where the accused was a well-known financier who had been
convicted of fraud.' 4 Both the pre-trial hearing and the trial were
televised in part.' 5 The Supreme Court reversed the defendant's
convictions, partially resting its decision on the physical distractions caused by the television equipment, which the Court perceived
0 It was this
as interfering with defendant's right to a fair trial.'1
perception that precipitated the Court's allusion that technological
advances in television equipment could eventually eliminate distractions inherent in televising trials.'0
The technological advances envisioned by the Estes Court are
now a reality. Modern television cameras can be operated noiselessly, without the need for additional lighting, and no longer pose
a source of distraction to those present.'0 In addition, equally unobtrusive microphones have also been developed. ' 01 In light of these
advances, the physical distraction argument loses most of its force.
However, modern technology has not cured one potential physical
distraction which could be caused by courtroom televisioncommercial interruption of the trial proceedings.I0 Television
stations operate on the basis of commercial sponsorship and programs must frequently be interrupted for advertisements."' A televised trial may not prove immune from such interruption. It is also
possible that television stations would attempt to adjust the trial
101. See Doubles, supra note 4, at 2, 3.
102. State v. Hauptmann, 115 N.J. 412, 180 A. 809 cert. denied, 296 U.S. 649 (1935).
103. Doubles, supra note 4, at 2.
104. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
105. Id. at 536-37.
106. Id. at 550-51.
107. Id. at 551-52.
108. See Blashfield, supra note 4, at 429; Comment, The Televised Trial: A Perspective,
7 Cum.-SAM. L. REV. 323, 327 (1976).
109. See Blashfield, supra note 3, at 429.
110. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 571, 573 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring); Raichile, Broadcasters In The Courtroom: Two Views-If there is to be an Abridgement of
PretrialCommunication, Should it be Coupled with an Expansion of Trial Coverage by Radio
and Television, 21 FED. COM. BAR J. 42, 46, 47 (1967). See also Griswold, The Standards of
the Legal Profession: Canon 35 Should Not Be Surrendered, supra note 4, at 616.
111. The notable exception to this general rule is the Public Broadcasting system (PBS),
which operates without advertising revenue.
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schedule (e.g., court recesses) to coincide with the schedule of commercial interruptions."' The problem of commercial interruption
3
adds new vitality to the physical distraction argument."
2.

Psychological Effects

The main concern of those who oppose televised trials is that
television will have an adverse psychological effect on trial participants."' In Estes v. Texas,"5 the Supreme Court noted that jury
attentiveness would be diminished by the presence of television
cameras."' The Court felt that "not only will the juror's eyes be
fixed on the camera, but also his mind will be preoccupied with the
telecasting rather than with the testimony.""' The Court was also
concerned about television's impact upon the witnesses, fearing the
camera's presence would undermine the accuracy of the testimony
being given and that the cameras would frighten timid witnesses,
while coaxing "cocky" witnesses into overstatement."' Additionally, neither the trial judge nor the lawyers were found to be immune
from the effects caused by the presence of the television cameras."'
Both would have a tendency to "play" to the cameras.Y2 In light of
these factors, the Court concluded that allowing television into the
courtroom would be highly prejudicial to the defendant and would
violate his right to a fair trial.''
112. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 573 (1965) (Warren, C.J. concurring). As one legal
commentator noted, this could have a peculiarly distracting effect on the trial, "I ask, and
not facetiously, will a judge be importuned to pause and consider his ruling at a given
juncture of a case before giving it, so a commercial can serve the . . . purpose of advertising
?" Raichile, BroadcastersIn The Courtroom: Two Views, supra
the sponsor's product ....
note 110, at 47. It should be noted that if PBS was the sole network covering trials, the
problem of commercial iterruption would be avoided.
113. Another effect courtroom television could have on trials is that trial participants, in
an effort to conform to the expectations of their audience, might begin to act in a manner
most familiar to the television audience, i.e., in a manner similar to trial participants in
lawyer-television shows. As one political commentator noted:
Almost half of the things detectives do in the course of an investigation are done
for "public relations" reasons. In other words, most of the fingerprinting, showing
the victim mug shots, lineups, and other details that American television audiences
expect are done by real police only because the television audiences-which presumably include the victim of the real crime they are investigating-have come to
expect it.
Esquire, April 25, 1978, at 54, quoting MANKEWICZ & SWERDLOW, REMOTE CONTROL.
114. See, e.g., Doubles, supra note 4, at 4, 5; Griswold, The Standards of the Legal
Profession: Canon 35 Should Not Be Surrendered,supra note 4, at 617.
115. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
116. Id. at 546.
117. Id.
118. Id.at 547.
119. Id. at 548, 579.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 545-50; see note 8 supra. It should be noted that Justice Harlan's concurrence
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The Supreme Court's reasoning in Estes has been sharply challenged. It has been argued that television's psychological effects are
a matter of speculation, 2 2 and that there is no basis for such conjecture in the records of any of the trials that have thus far been
televised." 3 The experiences of states which have allowed televised
trials appear to substantiate this contention. In Colorado, where
televised trials have been allowed since 1956, there have been no
complaints of adverse psychological effects on trial participants.' 24
Similarly, in experiments in Texas, no evidence of "grandstanding"
by the attorneys or witnesses, or any other adverse effects were
found. 2 51 In addition, defendants who have sought to have their
convictions overturned because the trial judge allowed television
cameras into the courtroom, have met with little success. 2 However, prejudice resulting from courtroom use of television is extremely difficult to discern. As Chief Justice Warren noted in his
concurring opinion in Estes:
How is the defendant to prove that the prosecutor acted differently
than he ordinarily would have, that defense counsel was more concerned with impressing prospective clients than with the interests
of the defendant, that a juror was so concerned with how he appeared on television that his mind continually wandered from the
proceedings, that an important defense witness made a bad impression on the jury because he was "playing" to the television
audience, or that the judge was a little more lenient or a little more
strict than he might be? And then, how is petitioner to show that
this combination of changed attitudes diverted the trial sufficiently from its purpose to deprive him of a fair trial?'
It is conceivable that this type of prejudice has been overlooked
by the courts since it manifests itself in a subtle form which is
difficult for either the trial or appellate bench to perceive.' 28 Merely
because the psychological effects are subtle does not justify characleft open the possibility that human adjustment to television cameras could eventually eliminate these adverse psychological effects. Id. at 595, 596.
122. Wilson, supra note 11, at 294, 295; Monroe, supra note 11, at 52.
123. Wilson, supra note 11, at 292, 295.
124. See Hall, Colorado's Six Years Experience Without Judicial Canon 35, 48 A.B.A.J.

1120 (1962).
125. Note, ConstitutionalAspects of Television In The Courtroom, 35 U. CiN. L. REV. 48,
66 (1966).
126. See, e.g., Bradley v. Texas, 470 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1972); Gonzales v. People, 165
Colo. 322, 438 P.2d 686 (1968); Lyles v. State 330 P.2d 734 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958).
127. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 579 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
128. Chief Justice Warren suggested that it would be difficult for appellate courts to find
any prejudice caused by the presence of the television cameras even if they had a complete
film of the trial. 381 U.S. at 579-80.
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terizing them as speculative. Certainly if proven, they represent a
serious threat to the administering of a fair trial." 9 The Constitution's commitment to the concept of a fair trial should place the
burden on proponents to show that the psychological effects are
indeed minimal.
3.

Prejudicial Publicity

The problem of prejudicial publicity is twofold. First, it is feared
that if a trial is televised public opinion will become an unwanted
and powerful thirteenth juror. 3 " Second, there is concern that if the
trial court's determination is reversed, the publicity the case received would make it impossible for the accused to receive an impartial new trial. 3 '
While public opinion is often a decisive factor in the resolution of
issues in this country, its impact on the adjudicative branch of
government is perilous. 3 ' The adverse impact which mass opinion
can have on the administration of justice has often been demonstrated.13 This problem is exacerbated by local newspapers and the
media which exhort juries and judges to particular verdicts based
on that opinion. 34 Television's presence in the courtroom would
bring the pressures of public opinion even closer to the decision
making process. 35 In addition, if the trial were not televised in its
entirety, the public would base its impressions on segments of the
proceedings and attain a misimpression of the merits of a case.'3
Witnesses could face pressure from neighbors who have been watching the trial on television to withhold or change their testimony so
that a "correct" verdict would be reached. 3 Thus, not only would
television bring with it to the courtroom the specter of public opinion, but it could at the same time shape that opinion. The anomalous effect would be to place the sanctity of the trial one step closer
to the taint from external forces.
Opponents of televised trials argue that prejudicial publicity will
be more pronounced when a televised trial must be retried. 38 A large
129. Estes v. Texas, 387 U.S. 532, 565 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
130. See Douglas, supra note 37, at 6, 8, 10.
131. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 546, 547 (1965); Yesawich, supra note 2, at 710.
132. Douglas, supra note 37, at 9-10.
133. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961);
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
134. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S.
181 (1952).
135. See Douglas, supra note 37, at 8-10.
136. Id. at 9. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 574 (1965); Yesawich, supra note 2, at 710.
137. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 547 (1965).
138. Yesawich, supra note 2, at 710.
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television audience would increase the difficulty in finding twelve
uninfluenced jurors.'3 Although this is a valid concern, it is doubtful
that ". . . the risk of causing possible prejudice at a hypothectical
second trial ... " is alone sufficient to justify a prohibition of televised trials.'40
The ConstitutionalRights in the Balance
Courtroom television violates the constitutional rights of privacy
of the defendant and other trial participants.' In contrast, the ban
on televised trials does not infringe upon the sixth amendment right
of public trial.' Thus, if the balancing process were to end here,
televised trials would be deemed constitutionally impermissible.
However, other rights must be considered.
The ban on televised trials has been attacked as an unconstitutional prior restraint of the press. The prohibition of courtroom
television represents an in-court restraint upon the media's activities. To justify such restraints it must be established that the activities of the media constitute a possible threat to a fair trial.,13 Courtroom television does, in fact, endanger the administering of a fair
trial. The advance of technology eliminated some adverse effects
which television's physical presence had upon trial proceedings,'
other more serious effects remain. "' Thus, it cannot be said that
television could be allowed in the courtroom without jeopardizing
the defendant's right to a fair trial. It is submitted, therefore, that
the ban on televised trials is not an unconstitutional prior restraint
of the press and that such a prohibition is necessary to assure fair
and impartial proceedings. When the various competing constitutional interests are concurrently weighed, the balance tips in favor
of the ban on televised trials.
STATE GUIDELINES

Despite indications of unconstitutionality, certain states now
allow television in the courtroom. Presently, seven states permit
139. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963);
but cf. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
140. United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct.
1578 (1977). But cf. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), in which the Supreme Court
held that televising a defendant's confession in the small community where his trial was to
take place made it impossible for him to obtain a fair trial.
141. See text accompanying notes 32-52 supra.
142. See text accompanying notes 56-70 supra.
143. See text accompanying notes 77-79 & 96 supra.
144. See text accompanying notes 108-09 supra.
145. See text accompanying notes 110-21, 133-37 supra.
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trials to be televised.' 46 At least three of these states, Alabama,
Colorado and Florida, impose conditions and guidelines limiting
televised trials.'47 These jurisdictions believe that such conditions
and guidelines prevent the constitutional rights of the various trial
participants from being infringed upon by televising trials.'48 These
guidelines and their ability to convert courtroom television into a
constitutionally permissible practice, will now be examined.
Colorado & Alabama
Both the Supreme Court of Colorado and the Supreme Court of
Alabama have promulgated guidelines for the televising of trials. "'
The Colorado rules, which sought to prevent the physical presence
of television from "degrading the court"' 50 or "materially interfering
with the achievement of a fair trial,"' 5 ' were amended in response
to the Estes decision to require the consent of witnesses, jurors and
defendant prior to broadcasting.'52 The rules also vest final discretion with the trial judge, absent objections from any of the trial
participants.'53
The Alabama rules are similar to those of Colorado,' 5 except the
Alabama Supreme Court must approve telecasting prior to trial.'55
A plan must be submitted to the court which specifies location of
equipment and media personnel within the courtroom.' 6 These
plans ensure that the broadcasting of the proceedings "will not detract from the dignity of the court proceedings, distract any witness
from giving testimony, degrade the court, or otherwise interfere with
the achievement of a fair trial."' 57 Once this plan is approved, the
final decision whether to televise a trial, as under the Colorado
guidelines, rests in the discretion of the trial judge.' 8
146. See notes 5 & 13 supra and accompanying text.
147. See notes 5 & 13 supra.
148. See In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35, 133 Colo. 417, 296 P.2d 465 (1956); The
Televised Trial: A Perspective, 7 CUM.-SAM. L. REv. 323, 340, 341 (1976); In re Petition of
Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc. for Change in Code of Judicial Conduct, 347 So. 2d
404, 406, 407 (1977) (Karl, J., concurring specially).
149. See notes 5 & 13 supra.
150. COLORADO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT No. 3A(9)(10)(1977).
151. Id.
152. See note 5 supra.
153. COLORADO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT No. 3A(9)(10)(1977).
154. Compare ALABAMA CANONS OF JUDIcIAL ETmIcs No. 8A(7A) with COLORADO CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT No. 3A(9)(10)(1966).
155. ALABAMA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETics No. 3A(7A)(a)(1977). For further discussion see
note 13 supra.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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Florida
The Florida Supreme Court rule differs from those adopted in
Colorado and Alabama in three major respects. First, the rule in
Florida is experimental. Televising of trials is permitted in Florida
for only one year, and the program is scheduled to terminate in June
of 1978.' At that time, the Florida Supreme Court will make a final
decision as to the feasibility of televised trials., 0 Second, the Florida
rule does not require the consent of the trial participants as a prerequisite to televising a trial.' Third, the Florida guidelines impose
far greater restrictions upon the television industry's behavior
within the courtroom during the trial. The type of equipment which
must be used by the television stations is closely regulated,' as are
the number of cameras which may be employed.' 3 Furthermore, the
guidelines completely prohibit movement of media personnel or
broadcast equipment during the trial proceedings." 4 Finally, the
audio pick-up or broadcast of conferences between attorneys and
their clients, or between co-counsel, or between the attorney's and
the presiding judge, are expressly prohibited. 5
Evaluation of the Guidelines
The television guidelines in these states were promulgated to
prevent infringement of the constitutional rights of trial participants.' A brief review of these rules demonstrates that they do not
accomplish this goal.
All of the above states place restrictions upon the physical presence of television within the courtroom. These rules are effective to
159. Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc. for Change in Code of Judicial
Conduct, 347 So. 2d 404 (1977). For further discussion, see note 15 supra.
160. Id. at 406.
161. Petition of Post-Newsweek Station, Florida, Inc. for Change in Code of Judicial
Conduct, 347 So.2d 402, 403 (1977). For further discussion see note 13 supra.
162. Petition of Post-Newsweek Station, Florida, Inc. for Change in Code of Judicial
Conduct, 347 So. 2d 404, 407 (1977).
163. Id. at 405.
164. Id. at 406.
165. Id. It should be noted that the constitutionality of the Florida television experiment
was challenged upon its inception. Briklod v. Rivkind, 2 MED. L. Rem. 2258 (1977). The
plaintiff asked the federal district court to issue an injunctive order preventing his criminal
trial from being televised. Id. The court, relying on Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), held
that telvising this non-notorious criminal trial was not so "patently and flagrantly unconstitutional for the purposes of granting injunctive relief." Id. at 2260. However, the court specifically reserved ruling on the "ultimate merits of the plaintiff's constitutional claims," and
noted that it could only "speculate privately on the tragic possibility that an entire year's
worth of state court convictions-no matter how heinous the crime-may be subject to reversal through state and federal habeas corpus proceedings." Id. at 2260 & n.3.
166. See note 148 supra and accompanying text.
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prevent the physical distractions, created by the presence of television, from interfering with a trial. However, as noted above, the
physical distraction caused by television is the least significant
problem associated with televised trials."7 Presently, the only arguable potential for courtroom disruption concerns commercial delays
incident to televising trials.' 8 None of the state guidelines refer to
this problem specifically, although Colorado and Alabama do have
a requirement that the televising of the trial should neither
"degrade the court" nor "detract from the dignity of the proceedings."' 69 This language could be interpreted, in part, as a guard
against the problem of commercial interruption.
The main problem associated with televised trials is the harmful
psychological effect on trial participants caused by the presence of
television in the courtroom. 710 All of the state guidelines are of minimal utility in resolving this problem. In Colorado and Alabama, this
difficulty was believed to be largely eliminated by the requirement
that all trial participants consent to being televised.'' The rationale
behind this consent rule is that trial participants, who believe they
will be adversely affected by the presence of the television cameras,
can simply object to being televised. This logic is fallacious for three
reasons. First, it is only natural for witnesses and jurors to "accept
the conditions of the courtroom as the trial judge establishes
them .... 12 Even if the cameras were unsettling to them, it is
doubtful that a witness or juror would have the courage to object to
being televised.'7 3 Second, participants may not object for fear of
being labeled as a "weakling of some sort."' 74 Finally, there is the
problem of the witness or juror who fails to object because they want
to be on television.'7 5 Such individuals represent the greatest threat
to the administering of a fair trial since their attention will be focused on the camera, rather than the trial proceedings.'
Prejudicial publicity is another hazard to a fair trial connected
with courtroom television.' However, none of the state guidelines
167. See notes 100-09 supra and accompanying text.
168. See notes 110-13 supra and accompanying text.
169. COLORADO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT No. 3A(9)(10)(1977); ALABAMA CANONS OF JUDIcIAL ETmCS No. 3A(7A), in 37 ALA. LAw 10, 16 (1977).
170. See notes 114-21 supra and accompanying text.
171. See Comment, The Televised Trial: A Perspective, 7 CUM.-SAM. L. REv. 323, 340
(1976); Case Note, 38 U. COLO.L. REv. 276 (1966).
172. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 568 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
173. Doubles, supra note 4, at 14. Of course, this problem is even greater in Florida, which
has no consent requirement.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See notes 130-40 supra and accompanying text.
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effectively deal with this problem. Each jurisdiction leaves the decision of whether to televise a trial to the discretion of the trial
judge.' 8 It is believed that the trial judge will prohibit such televising if it would create a prejudicial atmosphere.' 79 Such reasoning
does not account for the problem presented by the politically ambitious judge, who recognizes the danger in televising a particular
trial, but who wishes to exploit the sensational nature of a case for
political purposes.' Another hazard is the trial judge who simply
surrenders to public pressure to televise a particular trial.''
Finally, the state guidelines do little to protect the privacy rights
of the trial participants. In Colorado and Alabama, privacy rights
are supposed to be protected by the consent requirement.' 2 As previously noted, such a requirement offers little to the trial participant
who does not wish to be televised." Furthermore, in Florida, the
privacy rights of trial participants do not even receive this limited
protection, since thet state's guidelines fail to include a consent
requirement.' 4 Additionally, none of the guidelines impose restrictions on the type of camera shots which are allowed. Thus, cameras
are free to shoot close-ups of the defendant at any time during the
trial. As noted earlier, this type of television coverage is a particu8 5
larly offensive form of invasion of privacy.
Thus, the regulatory guidelines adopted by Alabama, Colorado
and Florida actually provide few constitutional safeguards for trial
participants. It is uncertain whether modification of these guidelines could offer greater protection. However, it is clear that televising trials under the existing state guidelines is no more constitutionally permissible than if there were no guidelines at all.
CONCLUSION

Courtroom television presents a unique threat to the constitutional rights of trial participants. The accused, as well as the witnesses and jurors, are forced to endure a serious assault on their
privacy when trials are televised. In addition, the adverse impact
which television's presence has on the behavior of all of the trial
178. COLORADO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT No. 3A(9)(10)(1977); ALABAMA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS No. 3A(7A), in 37 ALA. LAw 10, 16 (1977); In re Petition of Post-Newsweek
Stations, Florida, Inc. for Change in Code of Judicial Conduct, 347 So. 2d 404 (1977).
179. See The Televised Trial: A Perspective, 7 CUM.-SAM. L. REv. 323, 340 n.159 (1976).
180. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 548, 549 (1965).
181. Id.
182. See note 171 supra.
183. See notes 172-74 supra and accompanying text.
184. See note 161 supra and accompanying text.
185. See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
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participants, from the jurors to the trial judge, impairs the defendant's ability to obtain a fair trial.
Proponents of courtroom television have attempted to justify the
idea on other constitutional grounds. However, this cannot be done.
Neither the constitutional guarantee of public trial, nor the freedom
of the press, are endangered by the ban on televised trials. As long
as television stations are free to send representatives to trials, the
rights of public trial and free press are secure.
Yet, certain states continue to televise trials and others are beginning to experiment with the idea. In some of these jurisdictions
it is believed that the constitutional rights of the defendant and
other trial participants are protected by guidelines which regulate
the practice of televising trials. These guidelines are inadequate
since they offer insignificant safeguards to protect the defendant's
right to a fair trial. In addition, these guidelines afford little or no
protection to the privacy interests of any of the trial participants.
Thus, those states which now televise trials have failed to effectively
curb the dangers which this activity poses to the constitutional
rights of privacy and fair trial.
In Estes v. Texas, 116 the Supreme Court ruled that televising certain criminal trials is unconstitutional. In this decision, the Court
recognized the serious dangers which courtroom television presents
to the administration of justice. The Supreme Court should reaffirm
its mandate in Estes in the modern day context. Until that time,
other courts should recognize the dangers inherent in televised trials
and resist the growing pressure to allow television into the courtroom.
SHELLY BYRON KULWIN
186.

381 U.S. 532 (1965).

